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Agriculture is today a motorized food industry, 
in essence the same as the manufacture of 
corpses in gas chambers and extermination 
camps, the same as the blockade and starvation 
of countries, the same as the manufacture of 
atomic bombs. 
(Ackerbau is jetzl motorisierte Emahrungs-
industrie, im Wesen das Selbe wie die 
Fabrikation von Leichen in Gaskammern und 
Vemichtungslagern, das Selbe wie die Blockade 
und Aushungerung von Landern, das Selbe wie 
die Fabrikation von Wasserstoffbomben.) 
-Martin Heidegger 
I. Introduction. 
It is common to be encouraged to consider Heidegger 
as a source of wisdom regarding anti-3Ilthropocentrism, 
especially because, it is alleged, Heidegger offers a 
compelling case against the tradition of Western 
antbropocentrism, be teacbes us how to "think" 
properly, and he indicates how to dwell authentically 
on the earth. 1 The purpose of the present article is to 
argue that it is not worth the time and effort to become 
familiar with Heidegger's life and writings for the 
purpose of learning how to argue the case for anti-
anthropocentrism. Heidegger does not succeed in 
developing a convincing case for bis type of anti-
anthropocentrism; indeed, I will argue that there is 
sometbing odious about bis critique of anthro-
pocentrism. The interpreter of Heidegger with whom I 
will be primarily engaged is Micbael Zimmennan, and 
this for two reasons. First, Zimmennan bas made the 
most balanced and detailed case for Heidegger as an 
important theoretician regarding anti-anthropocentrism. 
Indeed, Heidegger's thought is kept alive largely 
through talented scbolars like Zimmerman. Second, 
although a defender of Heidegger. Zimmerman is 
nonetheless willing to listen to criticisms of Heidegger's 
Nazism, unlike many dogmatic Heideggerians I have 
met.2 Heidegger's Nazism, I will suggest, is related to 
his inability to be persuasive regarding anti-
anthropocentrism. That is, I will avoid ad hominem 
arguments in that I will be claiming that Heidegger's 
anti-anthropocentrism interpenetrates with his 
intellectualized version of Nazism and is, as a 
consequence, inadequate for use by animal rightists. 
In the following section of the article I will outline 
Heidegger's critique of anthropocentrism, especially as 
that critique cbanges from the early to the later 
Heidegger. My hope in section 2 is not so much to do 
original Heidegger research as to indicate in a 
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preliminary way what some of the problems are with 
several of the bestknown ideas in Heidegger's work from 
the perspective of a version of anti-antlIropocentrism 
quite different from Heidegger's, specifically an animal 
rights version of anti-anthropocentrism. In section 3 I 
will consider Zimmerman's criticisms of Heidegger's 
anti-anthropocentrism, criticisms which are notewortlIy 
because Zimmerman has developed the most sophis-
ticated defense of environmentalism on a Heideggarian 
basis. But I will also try to show in sections 3 and 4 that 
some of the defects in Heidegger's thought are found 
in Zimmerman's as well, even in the thought of the later 
Zimmerman, which is more critical of Heidegger than 
the thought of the early Zimmerman. My own criticisms 
of Heidegger, and to a lesser extent of Zimmerman, 
have to do with the failure to acknowledge (Heidegger) 
or to defend consistently (Zimmerman) the rights of 
sentient individuals. Heidegger's own hatred of 
individualism and of rights was a contributing factor in 
his becoming a fascist, but, more importantly for the 
purposes of this article, denigration of individual rights 
by deep ecologists-including Heideggerian deep 
ecologists like Zimmerman-runs tlle danger of 
environmental fascism if not of fascism per se. 
2. Heidegger's Critique of Anthropocentrism. 
Heidegger's fundamental insigllt in Being and TIme is 
that there is a difference between Being and entities, (or 
beings). We are familiar with entities, like shoes or cows 
or numbers. But we have a hard time specifying what 
Being or is-ness means. On Heidegger's well-known 
view, Being is not an entity but refers to the self-
manifesting, presencing, or revealing of entities. For an 
entity to be (Le., to present or manifest itself), a 
corresponding absencing is needed, a cle.-'Uing constituted 
by human existence. In effect, humans are both a kind of 
entity and the clearing in which entities can he manifest. 
In this regard there is a minimal and non-botlIersome 
anthropocentrism in Heidegger's thought. 
For the Heidegger of Being and Time, entities like 
animals in some sense would persist if no humans 
existed, but they would not "be" in Heidegger's sense 
of being manifest within the clearing of human 
existence. The anthropocentric tendencies of Being and 
TIme, however, yield in Heidegger's later thought, 
according to Zimmerman, to a view which is consistent 
with most of the principles of deep (as opposed to 
supposedly superficial) ecology, with tlIe thought of 
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Aldo Leopold, and with "biocentric egalitarianism," an 
egalitarianism which, I will argue, is the most dreadful 
imaginable.3 In Being and TIme, at least, there is a certain 
degree of Kantianism in Heidegger's view of nature and 
of animals in that, despite the fact that we discover rather 
than create nature, including animals, we nonetheless 
discover it only within the historical world opened up by 
Dasein. Zimmerman puts the issue regarding Heidegger's 
minimal anthropocentrism this way: 
in Being and Time Heidegger fails to clarify 
the following puzzle: do natural entities show 
themselves either as instruments or as objects 
because these are the two major ontological 
dimensions of natural entities in and of 
themselves, or instead do natural entities show 
themselves as instruments or objects because 
these are the only two ways in which human 
existence is open for entities.4 
Zimmerman thinks we should commend even the 
Heidegger of Being and TIme for avoiding the ethically 
bothersome anthropocentrism of the animal rightist's 
nemesis, Descartes. Because human beings are ftnite, in 
Heidegger's view we cannot be open to entities in ways 
that exhaust what they are. But ever since the time of 
Plato, and especially since Descartes, we have tended to 
be open to them in extremely constricted, one-
dimensional ways. For Heidegger, who originally defmed 
human existence as care (Sorge), we fulftll our humanity 
when we exist in a way that lets entities be what they 
are instead of forcing them to serve our needs only. By 
allowing our understanding to be used solely for the 
purpose ofdominating entities, we have left the material 
world in general and animals in particular as inert and 
without intrinsic purpose. To the extent that Dasein is 
the measurer in Heidegger's philosophy, it is important 
to notice that human temporality is such that as epochs 
change entities show themselves in different ways. 
Natural entities, including animals, in modem philosophy 
often appear as strictly material mechanisms, and this is 
largely due to Descartes. These mechanisms are seen 
primarily as instruments for socio-economic purposes 
or for scientiftc investigation. It is Heidegger's belief 
that it is only by reappropriating our philosophical 
tradition, by rethinking Plato and Descartes and almost 
everyone else between the presocratics and Heidegger 
himself, that this bothersome sort of anthropocentrism 
can be ameliorated.5 
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Heidegger's replacement for the bothersome sort of 
anthropocentrism seems to be what he calls "the 
fourfold" (das Geviert), a configuration of earth and 
sky, mortal beings and the gods, wherein the order of 
nature emerges not out of a divine or human plan but 
out of the capacity of individuals to behave in their own 
ways such that they nonetheless produce an overall 
harmony: individuals adjust themselves to other 
individuals.6 The clearing of an open space in our culture 
so as to see animals largely reveals them as use values 
or as commodities; in a very real sense "primitive" 
peoples did not see the same sorts of chickens we see? 
Chickens are put in a frame (Gestell) for us by science-
technology. And it should be emphasized that there is 
no crucial distinction in Heidegger between science and 
technology, since science has in recent centuries been 
integrally connected to the will to power. 
In his later philosophy, Heidegger did not attribute 
inauthenticity to a lack of personal resoluteness but to a 
cultural phenomenon (i. e., to anthropocentrism). 
Authentic human existence in his later philosophy 
consists in the realization that humans are but one element 
in the fourfold, and not necessarily the most important 
one. This realization was never lost by peasants, on 
Zimmerman's interpretation of Heidegger, even if it has 
been lost (or better, killed) by agribusinessmen on factory 
farms. Because we have an obligation, according to 
Heidegger, to let things be, it would seem to be worse if 
an animal were killed by some human deed than if the 
animal were killed naturally. 
Several questions need to be asked here, however. 
a. There is the question of whether the anti-
anthropocentrism entailed in the fourfold is a 
variety of anti-humanism, as I will allege, or, as 
Zimmerman aIleges, is a type of "higher 
humanism" or "beyond humanism"-Zimmennan 
cannot decide which to hold.s 
b. What are we to make of Heidegger's claim that in 
technological culture moral distinctions lose their 
meaning? Is this claim actuaIly a ruse for 
Heidegger's own inability in his philosophy to 
make moral distinctions? 
c. Is it not the case that there is something a bit too 
convenient in the suggestion that, from a 
Heideggerian point of view, World War Two was 
due not to Hitler and the Nazis but to forgetfulness 
of being? And 
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d. Is it not also a bit too convenient to hold, if one 
was a dues-paying member of the Nazi Party from 
the early 19308 until the end of the war, as was 
Heidegger, that technological framing ofnature and 
animals is a defect found especially in democratic 
or capitalist cultures as well as in socialist ones? 
That is, what are anti-anthropocentrists to make of 
Heidegger's belief that the Germans (under Hitler) 
were the only people capable of bringing about a 
new beginning for the West, an anti-anthropocentric 
one, in a way at least somewhat analogous to the 
Greek beginning two millennia before?9 
Before moving to Zimmerman's criticisms of 
Heidegger and to my own responses to these questions, 
I would like briefly to examine Heidegger's approach 
to animals, in particular, as opposed to his stance(s) 
regarding anti-anthropocentrism in general. This 
examination will be crucial for what I have to say later 
on in section 4, when I will emphasize the importance 
of individual human beings and animals. Frederick 
Olafson is correct in noting that for Heidegger animals 
(or better, nonhuman animals) do not see entities as 
entities and that their vision is not informed by the 
categorical distinctions at work in human perception. 
Animals have "access" (Zugang) to entities, but, by way 
of contrast, human beings perceive entities as such. We 
are able to transcend entities toward their being as 
entities. Or again, animals are "world-poor" (weltarm) 
whereas inanimate things are "worldless" (weltlos).l0 
There is a type of reciprocity in animals which is clearly 
not found in inanimate things, but it is less clear how 
inferior animals are to human beings. Animals are not 
worldbuilding (weltbildend) beings, but they do encircle 
themselves (Sichumringen) with stimuli in ways that 
make inadequate any behavioristic analysis of them. 
Their openness to entities nonetheless is not to entities 
as entities, and this is apparently because of their failure 
to possess language. Rather, their openness is merely 
for the purpose of the release of drives. Both 
behaviorism and the theory of evolution treat animals 
in abstraction from this partial openness, hence 
Heidegger holds that animals demand of us a specific 
mode of "transposedness" (Versetztsein).ll 
In Being and TIme Heidegger makes it clear that 
animals can be seen merely as living beings, as can 
human beings, from certain points of view. But human 
beings can also be seen as rational animals, as living 
things which have reason. Such a view ofhuman beings, 
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although not false, nonetheless covers up what is 
distinctive about Dasein. That is, the Latin animal 
rationale is not quite as accurate as the Greek zoon logon 
in that logos refers not only to reason but more 
importantly to discourse,12 and it is discourse, it seems, 
which in a way makes a human being half godlike and 
hence only half animal: 
man understands his mortality as rootedness 
in an earth that is what it is by contrast with 
heaven or the heavens and tImt is what it is in 
light a/the heavens. The contrast is between 
the light, clarity, and openness of the heavens 
and the darkness, solidity, and impenetrability 
of the earth. The earth is both literally and 
figuratively lighted by the heavens.'3 
Zimmerman himself puts the point in even stronger 
terms: because of human discourse humans in a way 
are not animals, for to view them as merely naturalistic 
animals is to offer the nihilistic version of Aristotle's 
theory of human beings as rational animals rather than 
Aristotle's own somewhat less problematic version. 14 
3. Zimmerman's C.-iticisms. 
With this brief review of Heidegger's anti-antluo-
pocentrism and of his view of animals as a background, 
I will now move to Zimmerman's criticisms. It should 
be noted that before 1987 Zimmerman's view of 
Heidegger corresponded to tlle "official version" of 
Heidegger's political views. His more recent criticisms 
of Heidegger, brought on by tile work of Hugo Ott and 
Victor Farias,15 constitute an admirable example of 
intellectual honesty and the use of critical reason on 
Zimmerman's part. In 1990, he called Heidegger to 
task on at least three points regarding his anti-
anthropocentrism: (a) Zimmennan, as a self-proclaimed 
deep ecologist and radical environmentalist, tllinks tIlat 
there is a residual antllfopocentrism in Heidegger's later 
thought. Even though tlle later Heidegger abcmdoned 
the idea that Dasein is essentially different from all other 
entities, he did not integrate humanity into the seamless 
web of life described by ecologists, and tllis largely 
because Heidegger was always a severe critic of 
naturalism. Closely related is (b), Zinunerman's critique 
of Heidegger's antipathy to science. It is true that me 
sciences which deal with ecological issues and with 
animals are often implicated in scientism, or me view 
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that all entities are mere objects and that science is the 
basic (or me only reliable) source of information. Hence 
regarding these views Heidegger was correct, according 
to Zimmerman, to be distrustful. However, "insofar as 
Heidegger refused to take seriously the organic 
dimension of human existence, he may well be accused 
of having remained in a curious way tied to the human-
centered, dualistic metaphysical tradition of which he 
was so critical."16 
These criticisms are fine as far as they go, but 
regarding (c) Zimmerman only scratches the surface of 
what is bothersome about Heidegger's version of anti-
antllropocentrism, a version which is, as Zimmerman 
notes, integrally connected to a reactionary critique not 
only of industrialism but also of the whole modem 
world, including its notions of rights and autonomy. 
Zimmerman's criticism here goes like this: 
deep ecologists must examine seriously the 
implications of Heidegger's involvement with 
National Socialism. His willingness to 
support an authoritarian regime to "solve" 
the problems posed by modernity and 
industrialism, the ease with which he 
abandoned the principles of respect of the 
rights of others, his talk about a mystical 
"union" between Volk and earth, and his 
hierarchical views about those "gifted" with 
insight about me meaning of history-all this 
must give pause to those deep ecologists, most 
of whom recognize that authoritarianism, 
hierarchism, and communitarianism without 
respect for individual freedom are by no means 
"solutions" to the environmental crisis .... 
Deep ecologists want to be able to speak about 
the organic relatedness of all life on earth 
without being accused of reverting to fascist 
mythologizing. 17 
I would like to make it clear at this point that I am 
not claiming, nor is Zimmerman claiming, that 
Heidegger's philosophy is worthless because, say, he 
never clearly assigned blame to Germany or to the Nazis 
orto himselffor events between 1933 and 1945. Rather, 
I am only trying to advance me limited claim that there 
is a world of difference between, first, an anti-
anthropocentrism which nonetheless acknowledges mat 
anthropoi are worthy of respect and are possessors of 
rights and, secondly, an anti-anthropocentrism which 
29 Between the Species 
Heidegger's Anti-Anthropocentrism 
is perversely anti-human, to the point where, as the 
quotation at the beginning of this article indicates, 
there is no moral difference between machines that 
harvest wheat, those that milk cows, and the gas 
chambers. Heidegger is an example of the latter anti-
anthropocentrism, whereas Isaac Bashevis Singer is an 
example of the fonner. ls 
When Singer suggests that animals are constantly 
in danger of being sent to a humanly imposed 
"Treblinka" or that we often act like Nazis toward 
animals, he nonetheless makes it abundantly clear that: 
(a) the real Treblinka was a morally evil place, and (b) 
the nine million people killed in the death camps-six 
million of whom were Jews-constitute a still greater 
evil than the very real evil of, say, nine million animals 
killed in slaughterhouses or laboratories. Heidegger, by 
way of contrast, never condemned Treblinka, leaving 
some people to wonder whether he, as a good Nazi to 
the end, perhaps approved of it. But even if he had 
condemned Treblinka, it is by no means clear that he 
would have, or even could have, done so in any tenns 
stronger than he could have offered against the killing 
of nine million animals or nine million blades of grass. 
Even mowing the lawn violates the vague Heideggerian 
imperative to let things be (Gelassenheit). Admittedly, 
to let things be is not to be purely passive. It is (a) to 
open up a clearing in which things disclose themselves 
without undue interference and (b) to interact with 
things in respectful ways. But Heidegger is not helpful 
at all regarding what such respect means in our 
dealings with animals. 
There is something instructive in the (speciesist) 
cliche that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It 
is dangerous both to human and to other animal species 
to abandon rights in favor of the obscure notion that we 
should let things be. If Zimmennan is to be faulted, it 
is on two grounds. First, despite the fact that tlle later 
Zimmennan finds the quotation from Heidegger at tlle 
beginning of this article "astonishing," he thinks it has 
negative implications only regarding our evaluation of 
Heidegger's politics and not regarding his anti-
anthropocentrism. And second, although Zimmennan 
has largely left behind his earlier (very Heideggerian) 
cliticism of rights, he still shows traces of Heidegger's 
apparent stance that the Holocaust (and, we could add, 
mass extennination of animals)is more due to advanced 
technology than it is to a denigration of sentient 
individuals (whether pigs or Gypsies). When the later 
Zimmennan says that "Mass extennination in tlle Nazi 
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camps was possible only because of developments 
within industrial technology," it should be noted that 
the crucial piece of technology needed for the Holocaust 
to occur was the railroad and precise rail scheduling, 
which had been in existence since the nineteenth 
century. The final solution was far more of a low-tech 
operation than Heideggerians like to admit. That is, it 
will not do to blame technology simpliciter for 
disrespect shown to sentient individuals. 19 The 
remainder of this article will consist of an attempt to 
expand on Zimmennan's rather mild criticisms of 
Heidegger regarding these two areas. 
Several of the features ofHeidegger's thought which 
some find appealing, such as the idealization of peasant 
life contained in his notion of the four-fold, are 
nonetheless bothersome both because they appear to 
suggest simply a rejection of modem science, rather 
than a critical engagement with it, and because they 
seem to be connected with a notion of tradition that 
entails a rather vicious version of nationalism. Indeed, 
Heidegger refers to a new appropriation of Western 
tradition by Gennan language and philosophy, but this 
newness suggests that proper limits for human behavior 
toward other species cannot he established through 
current legal or moral fonns but only by Being itself, 
whatever that means. As Zimmennan notes, the new 
ethos suggested by Heidegger only seems to make sense 
if Being is hypostasized and personalized into a divine 
agent, as in his well-known claim that only a God can 
save us now.20 Even if Heidegger is correct in claiming 
that human beings go astray when they forget that they 
are not self-created, it is not clear that reminding us of 
that fact helps very much without an explicit statement 
of theistic belief on Heidegger's part: if Being is not to 
be divinized, why should we believe, along with 
Zimmennan, that we are "brought forth so that entities 
can manifest themselves "? (my emphasis)21 
Zimmennan's earlier thought was very much in the 
spirit of Heidegger in the claim that the philosophical 
doctrine of human rights justifies exploitation of 
nonhuman as well as human beings, presumably 
because the doctrine of rights is necessarily tied to 
anthropocentrlsm and hence to exploitation in general.22 
Rights, it seems, get in the way of our "primary 
obligation": to be open to the Being of entities. But not 
even the early Zimmennan favors Heidegger when he 
attacks not only rights but the whole project ofmorality, 
as is evidenced in the following puzzling quotation 
from Heidegger: 
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Every valuing, even where it values positively, 
is a subjectivizing. It does not let things be. 
Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid-solely 
as the object of its doing.23 
It is not surprising that this "leveling gaze," as Richard 
Wolin calls it,24 is more compatible with the deep 
ecological variety of anti-anthropocentrism than it is 
with the animal rights variety. Zimmerman, with John 
Rodman on his side,25 does not think that human beings 
are in a position to extend rights to other beings if their 
own hold on them is questionable.26 
Our supposed obligation to Being does in fact 
threaten the loss of hard-won rights. On early 
Zimmerman's Heideggerian view, political activism on 
behalf of animals itself is part of the problem in that it 
indicates a confidence that (frenetic) human activity can 
really improve things. Zimmerman admits that 
Heidegger's attitude toward animals is not consistent: 
at times he sees all entities as instances of physis, and 
at other times he concludes that human beings are 
radically different from animals and the rest of nature. 
Animals, on this latter alternative, lack openness to 
Being; hence, they cannot know that entities are. It is 
crucial to notice, however, that any attempt to gain 
consistency here would require an engagement with 
certain biological and psychological phenomena (like 
the central nervous system or the presence of pain), an 
engagement which is, according to Heideggerian 
reasoning, itself a type of activity and a type of Technik 
which leads us further into a forgetfulness of Being. 
As Heidegger continued to work his way out of 
subjectivism and anthropocentrism, he made it harder 
and harder to assess exactly where the similaribes and 
differences are between human beings and animals and 
how these similarities and differences have an impact 
on ethical questions. It is decidedly not the case, as the 
early Zimmerman alleges, that those who wish to extend 
rights to animals can do so only by seeing them as lesser 
human beings. In fact, animal rightists who defend the 
argument from marginal cases are often criticized 
because of their belief tllat many animals deserve more 
respect than some human beings.27 
The later Zimmerman shows at least some 
willingness to "make use of' available ethical theories, 
including theories defending rights, to prevent 
exploitation from occurring, but this is not his usual 
view, which rests foursquare on deep ecology's 
attachment to what Steve Sapontzis calls "total holism." 
Zimmerman thinks that somehow or other we will find 
adequate ways of dealing with inevitable conflicts 
among individuals and among species without 
utilitarianism and without rights theory. He hopes that 
somehow or other, by letting things be, these conflicts 
will sort themselves out.28 But surely Zimmerman errs 
here by following Heidegger's vagaries. Ethical 
problems do not sort themselves out, nor do their 
resolutions shine forth with middle-voiced clarity. What 
is frustrating about Heidegger's thought is the 
inconsistent way in which he does implicitly make 
ethical distinctions. Despite the fact that he does not see 
any ethical distinction between mechanized agriculture 
and the Holocaust, he does see one between a dam on 
the Rhine and a HOlderlin poem about the Rhine: to 
equate these two is an example of "monstrousness."29 
Both Max Scheler and Emmanuel Levinas have 
rightly criticized Heidegger for elevating Being over 
ethics. The later Zimmerman at least partially follows 
Scheler and Levinas in this regard: 
To some extent, Heidegger was following his 
predecessors Hegel and Nietzsche in claiming 
that the world-historical individual is "beyond 
good and evil." By portraying ethical matters 
as secondary considerations which arise within 
and which are limited to a particular historical 
world, however, Heidegger ran the risk of 
justifying whatever ethical form of life 
happened to emerge in a world "founded" by 
a new work of art. The demented "world" of 
National Socialism reveals what may be 
"justified" when artistic considerations are 
allowed to triumph over supposedly outmoded 
ethical ones. Heidegger's refusal to describe 
his behavior between 1933 and 1945 in terms 
of moral guilt stemmed from his belief that 
his "ontological calling" to found a new world 
removed him from the moral censure that 
pertained only to ordinary people. Of course, 
since the German people themselves were 
"extraordinary" in being called to the 
dangerous mission of founding a new world, 
since they risked so much in this noble venture, 
they too-in Heidegger's eyes-were not 
morally culpable.3o 
Ethics for Heidegger was part and parcel of the 
nihilistic modern age; hence, afortiori, ethical concern 
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for animals is at best misplaced. The later Zimmerman 
puts the point as follows: 
Heidegger could never straightforwardly 
admit that by "deconstructing" what he 
regarded as the Enlightenment's insidious 
principles of universal economic and political 
rights, by declaring that traditional Judeo-
Christian moral beliefs had been vacated by 
the death of God, by claiming that new 
historical worlds arise from a primal source 
that is "beyond good and evil," and by working 
to found such a world based on artistic-
ontological, not moral considerations, he 
helped to make possible the triumph of a truly 
radical evil. 31 
Although tlle later Zimmerman at least claims to be 
opposed to Heidegger's denigration of ethics, his deep 
ecological principles lead him to a "biocentric 
egalitarianism" wherein we are supposed to "love and 
respect all things," and presumably to love and respect 
them equally, if Zimmerman is serious about his 
egalitarianism. In short, we are likely to be left with an 
analogous sort of leveling gaze in the later Zimmerman 
that\ve are left with in Ule later Heidegger. I would like 
to make it abundantly clear that Zimmerman is no 
fascist, even if he is open to Tom Regan's charge of 
"environmental fascism." But neither Heidegger nor 
Zinunerman get off their respective hooks by claiming 
that the death camps and factory farms alike are 
predictable outcomes of the reckless power impulse of 
the Enlightenment without also confronting, as 
Zimmerman to some extent does, the liberatory gains 
made possible by tlle Enlightenment, gains whose 
beneficiaries include peas~mts, slaves, blacks, women, 
and belatedly, animals. It is no accident that the most 
widely read book written by a philosopher on the topic 
of animal "rights" is titled "Animal Liberation."32 
Heidegger's (inconsistently applied) strategy of 
avoidance of ethical distinctions is revelatory not only 
biographically but also philosophically, in that it is 
necessitated by his belief that "the world must be forced 
to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation"33 
before primal truth can be recaptured. Hence, factory 
fa.'1l1s and crematoria may actually be welcomed by 
Heidegger, if they help to bring about a turning away 
from Technik and a turning toward authentic techne (as 
art). (In Ulis regard, Heidegger looks like a latter day 
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Emperor Claudius.),fhat is, technological nihilism 
engenders its opposite, as in the lines from Holderlin 
of which Heidegger was fond: "Where the danger is, 
grows the saving power also." It is convenient not only 
for Heidegger the man but also for Heidegger the 
philosopher to say that events in the various 
slaughterhouses of Europe, in which all "cats" are 
grey, are not due to real life individuals but to 
Seinsvergessenheit. According to Wolin, one of the 
reasons why Heidegger did not deal adequately with 
real individuals was his fascination with the abstraction 
"concreteness" and the abstraction "historicity" at the 
expense of the concrete and historical: 
There is no smaIl measure of irony that such 
short-comings must be attributed to a thinker 
whose claim to philosophical originality in the 
1920s was based on an avowed revival of the 
dimension ofexistential concreteness that was 
otherwise so lacking in modem philosophy; a 
thinker whose great achievement was a 
purported reincorporation of "history"-via 
the category of "historicity"-into modem 
philosophical discourse. In truth, it is the 
essential facts of twentieth-century political 
life that Heidegger, time and again, shows 
himself incapable of comprehending.34 
Jurgen Habermas also thinks that Heidegger's 
etherealness (which Heidegger's followers confuse with 
profundity) is part of the problem: 
Because Being withdraws itself from the 
assertive grasp of descriptive statements, 
because it can only be encircled in indirect 
discourse and "rendered silent," the destinings 
of Being remain undiscoverable. The 
propositionally contentless speech about 
Being has, nevertheless, the illocutionary sense 
ofdemanding resignation to fate. Its practical-
political side consists in the perlocutionary 
effect ofa diffuse readiness to obey in relation 
to an indeterminate authority.35 
The eclipse of practical reason is no boon to human 
beings or animals or the natural environment. Wolin 
once again is perceptive regarding Heidegger's views 
in a quotation which is well worth the consideration of 
animal rightists: 
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Rather than attempting to isolate the process 
whereby instrumental reason, as tied to tile 
forces of the modern economy, has been 
elevated to the status of an end in itself at the 
expense of its practical corollary, his 
theoretical orientation seeks instead to promote 
a rejection of rationality in totO.36 
Even if, as the argument from marginal cases indicates, 
tllere is no simple way of asserting tilat tile value of 
every human life is superior to tllat of every animal, 
Wolin is nonetlleless correct in suggesting that there is 
something worse tilan useless in a misology which 
culminates in an incapacity to distinguish llinong the 
slaughter of a rational humllil being, tlle slaughter of a 
nonrational yet sentient animal, and tile felling of a tree 
or tlle damming of a river.3? 
4. Individual Animals. 
The upshot of tlle previous section is tllat: 
a. Zimmennan has oone an excellent job of indicating 
what tlle implications of Heidegger's tllOught are 
for animals, in particular, and for tlle environment, 
in general; 
b. the later Zimmennan makes at least some progress 
witll respect to criticism of Heidegger's thought 
in tllis regard; but 
c. even the later Zimmennan fails to emphasize, llild 
tllis due to his commitment to deep ecology, tlle 
dmlgers involved in a denigration of rights llild/or 
concern for sentient individuals. 
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That is, tllere are good reasons for defending tlle 
animal rights variety of anti-antllropocentrism, ratller 
tilan tlle deep ecology version, especially when we 
find deep ecologists-but not Zimmerman-
speaking favorably of Malthus or AIDS. Two quite 
different animal rightists can be used together to 
detail the defects in deep ecological anti-
anthropocentrism, in general, and its Heideggerian 
variety, in particular: Tom Regan and Steve 
Sapontzis. Regan has ably shown, I tllink, tllat not 
all living tllings are subjects-of-a-life; hence, living 
tllings are not to he viewed as having tlle same moral 
status. It may be the case that there are individuals 
who are not subjects-of-a-life but who do have 
inherent value of some sort: 
the very possibility of developing a genuine 
ethic of the environment, as distinct from an 
ethic for its use, turns on the possibility of 
making the case that natural objects, though 
they do not meet the subject-of-a-life criterion, 
can nonetheless have inherent value.38 
But those who try to establish the case for inherent 
value, he thinks, have their work cut out for them even 
if tlle task is not impossible. Altllough Heideggerians 
may be (unwittingly) correct, at least with respect to 
wild animals, to simply let them be, there is a 
considerable difficulty involved when trying to 
reconcile the individualistic nature of moral rights witll 
tile total holistic view of Heideggerian deep ecologists: 
It is difficult to see how thc notion of the rights 
of tlle individual could find a home witllin a 
view that, emotive connotations to one side, 
might be fairly dubbed "environmental 
fascism." To use Leopold's telling phrase, man 
is only a member of tlle biotic team."39 
Heidegger's own case indicates how close a connection 
there is between environmental fascism and fascism per 
se; hence, tllere is notlling histrionic in Regan's use of 
the tenn "fascism": 
If, to take an extreme, fanciful but, it is hoped, 
not unfair exarnple, tlle situation we faced was 
eitller to kill a rare wildflower or a (plentiful) 
human being, and if tlle wildflower, as a 'tearn 
member," would contribute more to the 
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integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community than the human, then presumably 
we would not be doing wrong if we killed the 
human and saved the wildflower. The rights 
view cannot abide this position... because it 
denies the propriety of deciding what should 
be done to individuals who have rights by 
appeal to aggregati ve considerations ....  
Environmentai fascism and the rights view arc 
like oil and water: they don't mix.4o 
Although Sapontzis' version ofanti-anthropocentrism 
is very often at odds with Regan's, they complement each 
other in the effort to show the defects in deep ecological 
anti-anthropocentrism, particularly in its Heideggerian 
variety. Considering tlle long-term well-being of human 
beings and of animals includes a healthy supply of 
oxygen, rich soil, etc. Parking lots and plastic trees do 
not contribute to healthy animal life. Sapontzis is correct 
in claiming that there is a false dilemma between 
individualism and holism. Rights theory, utilitarianism, 
virtue-based ethics, and Sapontzis' own version ofethical 
scepticism are alike in being panially holistic. The total 
holism of (early and late) Zinunerman or of J. Baird 
Callicott, wherein the good of the biotic community is 
the ultimate measure of ethical value is, if not a type of 
fascism, at the very least a type of indifference to the 
suffering of animals and of human beings: 
The common moral goal of reducing the 
suffering in life and otherwise making life 
more enjoyable and fulfilling would not 
obviously be more etIectively pursued by 
valuing individuals only as contributors to a 
community. Indeed, since it is individuals, not 
communities, that experience enjoyment, 
fulfillment, distress, and frustration, and since 
total holism proposes regarding individuals as 
disposable items in the pursuit of the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the community, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that total 
holism would not provide as likely a path to 
this moral goal as our current, mixed 
morality, which directly values individuals 
and their quality of life.41 
Jews and Poles and cows and deer suffer, notcowhood 
or an ecosystem or the Heimat. In addition, Callicott, 
like some Heideggerians, wistfully dreams of a return 
Between the Species 34 
to premodern existence, wherein lies a more symbiotic 
relationship with the natural environment, a dream 
which might be taken -:fl.ore seriously if Callicott and 
Heidegger were not: 
fundamentally out of touch with contemporary 
morality, which emphasizes compassion for the 
injured, the sick, and the handicapped, tolerance 
for diverse ways of life, concern to expand the 
diversity of opportunities and experiences 
available to people, protecting the weak against 
the strong, and hope for progress.42 
And this progress, on the animal rightist's version ofanti-
anthropocentrism, is more likely to occur if we were to: 
consider the case of the dog: even if no other 
sentient being values it (or could value it), 
the dog can still have feelings of well-being 
about itself and its condition and can, 
therefore, still be of value for itself. Thus, 
the dog can be valued not only by anoilier, 
either as an instrument or for itself; the dog 
can also be valued by itself, and it is that latter 
possibility, and the moral significance of it, 
that is at issue in the debate over animal rights 
and that is completely lacking in the case of 
nonsentient entities.43 
It is not the case, as Callicott and the early 
Zimmerman allege, that emphasis on individual rights 
and on only partial holism will necessarily mean 
destruction of the natural environment: nonsentient parts' 
of nature have aesthetic and symbolic significance; 
they have life-support and economic and recreational 
value; they have scientific and historical and religious 
inspiration value; they help us to build character and 
to appreciate both the pretty and the sublime; etc. 
Consequently, carrying on the work of animal 
protection and reform does not require ascTibing direct 
moral status to nonsentient entities.44 That is, once we 
abandon the Heideggerian and deep ecological belief 
in "biocentric egalitarianism," as Zimmerman refers to 
it, we are not necessarily committed to the belief iliat 
nonsentient beings have value only as natural resources. 
It is not clear to me that Heidegger's "egalitarianism," 
if that is the word for the perverse position he defends, 
can help human beings or animals or, for that matter, 
nonsentient nature. If help is to be given, it is most likely 
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to come from the creative tension among the thoughts 
of rights theorists like Regan, utilitarians like Peter 
Singer,45 virtue theorists like Stephen R. L. Clark,46 
metaphysicians like Charles Hmtshome, and moral 
sceptics like Sapontzis. 
By failing to acknowledge Heidegger as a source 
of wisdom regarding anti-anthropocentrism, I am 
perhaps open to the charge that I mn engaging in a 
logic of contamination: Heidegger's thought leads to 
fascism and deep ecology, therefore deep ecology is 
fascist But this is not exactly my view. Rather, I am 
claiming that deep ecology is not necessarily fascist, 
even if it is a very real possibility Ulat it degenerate 
into environmental (if not real) fascism. The strong 
connection between environmental ~md real fascism, 
on the one hand, and deep ecology, on the oUler, lies in 
the fact that they both commit the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness, and they commit it in tile same way. This 
fallacy consists in treating abstractions as if they were 
concrete particulars. BOlh fascists and deep ecologists 
have been found to say at one point or another that "The 
individual by himself counts for nothing," as when 
Heidegger claims that: 
Since tile beginning of my installation, the 
initial principle and the authentic aim [of my 
Rektorat] ...reside in the radical transfonnation 
of intellectual education into a function of the 
forces and demands of the National Socialist 
state.... One cannot presume [to know] what 
will remain of our transitory works.... The 
only certainty is that our fierce will, inclined 
toward the future, gives a meaning and brings 
support to our most simple effort. The 
individual by himself counts for notlling. It is 
the destiny of our nation incamated by its state 
that matters.47 
Heidegger also claims tllat "In troUl, however, my works 
belong not to my person, but instead they serve the 
Gennan future and belong to it."48 Zimmennan is to be 
commended for the way in which he, in his later 
philosophy, at times speaks of the intrinsic worth of 
individual members of an ecosystem (but which?), and 
of individual freedoms (but whose?). It is when he 
speaks in tllis manner that he is justified in resenting 
the charge that deep ecologists are calling for fascist 
measures to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the 
larger cosmic whole.49 
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But there are still some areas even in the later 
Zimmerman that are likely to bother animal rightists and 
political liberals. There is perhaps good reason for 
Zimmennan to encourage not the destruction ofbut rather 
the surpassing of the ego as part of the "emancipation" 
ofnature, but such an emancipation would have to occur 
before the need for rights is surpassed. For example, in 
the most recent Zimmennan we fmd him criticizing the 
radical deep ecologist Christopher Manes for abandoning 
rights, but only because Manes does so without a trace 
of irony, as if such an abandonment would be tolerable 
if done ironically. Zimmennan also implicitly denigrates 
rights when he repeatedly refers to his position as a 
biocentric egalitarianism: are we to assume that certain 
rocks or grasses are morally equal to cows and human 
beings? We are not told. And in the most recent 
Zimmennan, the word "rights" is still placed in scare 
quotes.50 When a utilitarian does this I am bothered, but 
at least I understand why the utilitarian uses the scare 
quotes; when Heideggerians like Zimmennan do so. I 
develop a nervous twitch.51 Perhaps in Zimmennan's 
future writings he will indicate: 
a. a bit more clearly where he stands on the problem 
of the one and the many as it relates to anti-
anthropocentrism issues and 
b. whether I am correct in claiming that because of 
his Heideggerian deep ecology he is, at present, 
at best a lukewann defender of the many sentient 
individuals about us. 
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